OP-ED: The Marketplace of Ideas, Reimagined: Joe Rogan and the New Populist Media
Francis Fukuyama announced in 1996 “The End of History” that the structure of the Western world had entered a post-capitalist era in which, rather than socialist movements, the new generations witnessed the unraveling of neo-liberalist structures before them. In 2007 the housing market crashed forever marking that realization that this structure that promised to regulate itself ultimately had failed to do so, and in 2010, when the government bailed out Wall Street with close to $428 billion, the separation of power as had been advertised holding together the democratic ideals had been breached to the point of no return, and a new generation began to look inward, or somewhat outward, into a libertarian void: the internet.
The digital revolution, pre-launched in the 1990s, promised a decentralized public sphere where a “marketplace of ideas” would regulate itself through attention and consumer choice. In effect, if you platform everyone who has completely irreconcilable opinions, such as to inflame those differences, they would eventually separate into different subcultures, further radicalizing them. Saurette and Gunster describe a similar utopian ideal in talk radio, where “public discussion… what he imagines at kitchen tables… a frank, honest and confrontational exchange open to anyone” (2011, p. 212). But they also show how such spaces become epistemological populism: a style that “privileges lived experience and common sense” while “framing elite or expert knowledge as corrupt, suspect, or irrelevant” (p. 210).
As online content became increasingly widespread, newer generations started being politically radicalized online. With nothing but the hyperconsumerist capitalism that they were born into to attest to, the development of political imagination and envisioning within the material reality was replaced by the promise of the free market of ideas. While Saurette and Gunster’s account centers on ideologically partisan, combative talk radio, The Joe Rogan Experience modifies epistemological populism into a depoliticized, ideologically fluid, and entertainment-driven form. Rogan’s style keeps the populist appeal to authenticity and common sense but dilutes overt partisanship, replacing it with a marketplace of contrarian personalities, where ideological boundaries are blurred and political discourse is packaged as long-form lifestyle conversation.
From Neoliberal Collapse to Digital Political Imagination
When Donald Trump ran a populist campaign against establishment centrists, resting on a populist ‘anti-woke’ agenda, his rhetorical style mirrored what Saurette and Gunster describe as populism’s affective appeal: framing politics as a battle between “the people” and “the elites,” where authenticity trumps policy detail. Donald Trump had adopted the post-irony and rhetorical style of online populism that resonated with the digital political sphere in a manner that began to be mimicked nonsensically. In 2024, when he won a second time, headlines read “we need a Joe Rogan of the left” across mainstream media, and the podcasts were dubious (Grim, 2025). There was no need for a Joe Rogan of the left. Joe Rogan was once on the left. He is not the cause; he is the consequence. Where Adler's guests were filtered through a conservative lens, Rogan's lineup appears ideologically diverse; Bernie Sanders one week, Alex Jones the next. Yet this diversity is illusory.
Rogan as a Modified Epistemological Populist
The popularity of these podcasts is reflective of two things: a general rejection of the younger generations of the institutional infrastructure because of the neo-liberal unravelling they continue to witness betrayal from (political, mediatic, economic, and more), and a design of an alternative social reality online that, for digital natives, creates a libertarian utopia of idea imagination. The reason this energy was so widely channeled into conservative and alt-right spheres is due to the embedded cultural populism in these podcasts' epistemological design and rhetoric, which intersperses political energy with entertainment and lifestyle, leading to a casual and political atmosphere that reaches a young, mainstream, not news-prone audience.
This blend of political talk and lifestyle content recalls what Saurette and Gunster call “argutainment,” defined as “self-consciously adopted and defended employing a populist logic which defines itself as a utopian alternative to mainstream models of journalism” (2011, p. 216). The Joe Rogan Experience is a perfect microcosm of this dynamic. It is the world’s most popular podcast, with over 200 million monthly downloads and 6.1 billion views on its YouTube channel. Initially on radio and launched in 2009, the podcast hosted by Joe Rogan, a stand-up comedian and ex-UFC commentator, signed a $200M deal with Spotify in 2020 and has been an indicator of the independent anti-establishment tilt ever since, with his guests veering away from established celebrities to more and more alternative figures (from Alex Jones, Jordan Peterson, RFK Jr. to Elon Musk), all the while maintaining a regimen of athletes and comedians, and after 2021, the regular appearance of FBI chiefs, ex-CIA agents, astrophysicists, and pseudo-intellectuals (Allchorn, 2024).
Common Sense, Neutrality, and the “Just Asking Questions” Method
Rogan states, “I have interesting people on, and some of them have opinions that other people find reprehensible... I’m not here to judge. I’m here to have conversations.” Rogan’s free speech principle and political fluidity embody the techno-libertarian motto for the digital revolution, anti-establishment impositions—his only mechanism of regulation, the audience feedback loop, in other words, ‘the people.’ For Saurette and Gunster, the danger of epistemological populism lies in its construction of debate where “there is little room, and even less reason, to listen to others” (2011, p. 230). Rogan modifies this; there is room to listen, but the listening is stripped of journalistic fact-checking or accountability, reframing political interviews as casual and intimate “hangouts.”
For example, when discussing allegations of Russian election interference during Rogan's interview with Donald Trump ahead of the 2024 election, he frames the issue not as a factual dispute but as a moral crusade: "They swept that story... even though they knew... anyone who considers himself a legitimate objective observer of American politics, if you really want the best person to win, you would want people not to lie. And the only reason why they got away with this lie was because they continually labeled you as... Hitler." Here, Rogan employs Adler's "common sense" rhetoric ("anyone who considers himself a legitimate observer") while amplifying the conspiratorial undertones of Trump's discourse. The invocation of "lying" media and hyperbolic comparisons to Hitler mirrors Adler's dismissal of elites as "hustlers," but with a critical twist: Rogan's delivery is casual, even ambivalent, as if he is merely "thinking aloud" rather than advocating a position. This performative neutrality is JRE's innovation: epistemological populism repackaged as freewheeling curiosity.
Saurette and Gunster warn that epistemological populism "immunizes listeners against countervailing arguments and evidence" (2011). JRE takes this further by eroding the distinction between expertise and opinion entirely. Rogan frequently disclaims his authority ("I’m not an expert, I’m just a curious guy"), yet his platform grants him unparalleled influence in shaping political discourse. The appeal to common sense is undeniable with Rogan; all pretenses of issue-by-issue analysis dissipate when he talks to Donald Trump. This is partly because he does not view DT as a president with policies but rather as one of his regular, contrarian, and misunderstood guests. In doing so, Rogan humanizes right-wing figures while avoiding reprimendable endorsement, a categorical shift from the overt partisan attack style of Adler’s talk radio.
Depoliticized Populism as Ideological Fluidity
Rogan to his audience is the populist gatekeeper letting all the ideologically uninvested mainstream public look outside the gates for a couple of hours (at far-right ideas mostly), free to choose whether to step back into the house or drive into a rabbit hole. He rides the wave, platforms the current political flame, limits his intervention, and seeks to create a rationalization of radicals that those interested can add to their repertoire, while others watch with curiosity without feeling personally invested. In this new age, populism becomes identity play, and Joe Rogan is a transitional phase of comfort. The epistemological populist method is the same, but it has been infused with the ideological depletion of the times. The host frequently frames his ideologies through a series of innocent questions, under the veneer that the podcast is devoid of an agenda. This ideological fluidity is a key modification: S&G’s talk radio hosts often sought to cement partisan loyalty; Rogan instead commodifies contrarianism itself, making political orientation a matter of personal vibe rather than policy alignment.
The Genre Becomes the Norm
What differentiates new media from the epistemological populist structure of Adler’s show is the dismissal of journalistic integrity and standards surrounding political influence and the watering down of its consequences by framing it as cultural rather than ideological or political. The danger is not viewership or simply the leaning of the ideas, it is the form and the style, which has now permeated way beyond Joe Rogan into an entire ubiquitous genre, an elevated norm. Sam Wolfson of The Guardian describes these podcasts as such: “they’re kind of boring, kind of personal, unedited, the research perfunctory, conjecture flows freely, conclusions are delusive, the people who host them are not that smart, and so it’s easy to get cosy in the warm blanket of male grievance with a man who believes war crimes are justified and women shouldn’t serve in the military” (Wolfson, 2024).
For instance, the Nelk Boys, a group of young men who initially amassed popularity for hosting pranks, going to UFC fights, and drinking at frat houses, started hosting a podcast and recently hosted a man wanted by the ICC for War Crimes, the Prime Minister of a state currently under investigation by the ICJ for Genocide in Gaza, Benjamin Netanyahu, only to state their ignorance on “anything going on” early on. They proceeded not to ask him a single question about the ongoing starvation and ethnic cleansing campaign he has been conducting, preferring instead to joke about how his preference for Burger King over McDonald’s was “probably his worst take ever.” Saurette and Gunster’s warning that epistemological populism risks creating a political culture where “politics becomes indistinguishable from entertainment” (2011, p. 228) now plays out in a medium where that indistinguishability is the selling point.
Conclusion
What the new media sphere is currently undergoing that Gunster et al’s theory could not replicate is the crisis of identity in the phase of a rising anti-establishment culture, which is no longer able to be satisfied by the dialect of populism but driven by a nascent political ideology. The Nelk Boys’ audience overlaps with Rogan’s, and the outrage in their comment section and the subsequent decline in followers suggest that a political shift is rising, and that even the Rogan doctrine of “we’ll have anybody on” has boundaries. By situating Rogan within S&G’s framework, it becomes clear that he modifies epistemological populism for the podcast era: retaining its suspicion of elites and privileging of authenticity, but removing overt partisan alignment, blending it with lifestyle culture, and marketing it as neutral curiosity. The result is a depoliticized populism that sustains audience engagement while eroding epistemic standards, and that has now become the default template for political talk in the age of long-form new media.
What is missing is not a crafted replication; it is genuine, accessible, and politically unifying ideological progress for a generation that has expanded the Overton window on either side of the political spectrum and shattered the center. The horseshoe theory has never been more relevant, now that Trump has become the establishment, JRE the mainstream, and anti-woke the federal policy. As the pendulum swings back, it is in new esoteric political spheres of new media that these masses of the independent (left and right) will counter ideology to drive their populist wave.
